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Abstract
We present a novel formalization of counterfactual condition-
als in a quantified modal logic. Counterfactual conditionals
play a vital role in ethical and moral reasoning. Prior work
has shown that moral reasoning systems (and more gener-
ally, theory-of-mind reasoning systems) should be at least
as expressive as first-order (quantified) modal logic (QML)
to be well-behaved. While existing work on moral reasoning
has focused on counterfactual-free QML moral reasoning, we
present a fully specified and implemented formal system that
includes counterfactual conditionals. We validate our model
with two projects. In the first project, we demonstrate that our
system can be used to model a complex moral principle, the
doctrine of double effect. In the second project, we use the
system to build a data-set with true and false counterfactuals
as licensed by our theory, which we believe can be useful for
other researchers. This project also shows that our model can
be computationally feasible.
Introduction
Natural-language counterfactual conditionals (or simply
counterfactuals) are statements that have two parts (seman-
tically, and sometimes syntactically): an antecedent and a
consequent. Counterfactual conditionals differ from stan-
dard material conditionals in that the mere falsity of the an-
tecedent does not lead to the conditional being true. For ex-
ample, the sentence “If John had gone to the doctor, John
would not be sick now” is considered a counterfactual as
it is usually uttered when “John has not gone to the doc-
tor”. Note that the surface syntactic form of such condition-
als might not be an explicit conditional such as “If X then
Y”; for example: “John going to the doctor would have pre-
vented John being sick now”. Material conditionals in clas-
sical logic fail when used to model such sentences. Coun-
terfactuals occur in certain ethical principles and are often
associated with moral reasoning. We present a formal com-
putational model for such conditionals.
The plan for the paper is as follows. We give a brief
overview of how counterfactuals are used, focusing onmoral
reasoning. Then we briefly discuss prior art in modeling
counterfactuals, including computational studies of counter-
factuals. We then present our formal system, used as a foun-
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dation for building our model of counterfactual condition-
als. After this, we present the model itself and prove some
general properties of the system. We end by discussing two
projects to demonstrate how the formal model can be used.
Use of Counterfactual Conditionals
Counterfactual reasoning plays a vital role in human moral
reasoning. For instance, the doctrine of double effect
(DDE) requires counterfactual statements in its full for-
malization. DDE is an attractive target for building ethical
machines, as numerous empirical studies have shown that
human behavior in moral dilemmas is in accordance with
what the doctrine (or modified versions of it) predict.1 An-
other reason for considering DDE is that many legal sys-
tems use the doctrine for defining criminality. We briefly
state the doctrine below. Assume that we have an ethical hi-
erarchy of actions as in the deontological case (e.g. forbid-
den, morally neutral, obligatory); see (McNamara 2010).2
We also assume that we have a utility or goodness function
for states of the world or effects, as in the consequentialist
case. Given an agent a, an action α in a situation σ at time
t is said to be DDE-compliant iff (the clauses are verbatim
from (Govindarajulu and Bringsjord 2017a)):
DDE Informal
C1 the action is not forbidden
C2 the net utility or goodness of the action is greater than
some positive amount γ;
C3a the agent performing the action intends only the good
effects;
C3b the agent does not intend any of the bad effects;
C4 the bad effects are not used as a means to obtain the good
effects; and
C5 if there are bad effects, the agent would rather the sit-
uation be different and the agent not have to perform the
action. That is, the action is unavoidable.
Note that while (Govindarajulu and Bringsjord 2017a)
present a formalization and corresponding implementation
1Moral dilemmas are situations in which all available actions
have large positive and negative effects.
2There are also exist in the literature more fine-grained hierar-
chies(Bringsjord 2015).
and “stopwatch” test of the first four clauses above, there
is no formalization of C5. Work presented here will enable
such a formalization. The last clause has been rewritten be-
low to make explicit its counterfactual nature.
C5 Broken Up
C5a The agent desires that the current situation be different.
C5b The agent believes that if the agent itself were in a dif-
ferent situation, the agent would not perform the action α.
Separately, (Migliore et al. 2014) have an empirical study
in which they elicit subjects to produce counterfactual an-
swers to questions in a mix of situations with and without
moral content. Their answers have the form ofC5a andC5b.
Their study shows with statistical significance that humans
spent more time responding to situations that had moral con-
tent. This suggests the presence of non-trivial counterfactual
reasoning in morally-charged situations.
Counterfactual reasoning also plays an important role in
the intelligence community in counterfactual forecasting
(Lehner 2017). In counterfacutal forecasting, analysts try to
forecast what would have happened if the situation in the
past was different than what we know, and as Lehner states
there is a need for formal/automated tools for counterfactual
reasoning.
Prior Art
Most formal modeling of counterfactuals has been in work
on subjunctive conditionals. While there are varying defi-
nitions of what a subjunctive conditional is, the hallmark of
such conditionals is that the antecedent, while not necessar-
ily contrary to established facts (as is the case in counter-
factuals), does speak of what could hold even if it presently
doesn’t; and then the consequent expresses that which would
(at least supposedly) hold were this antecedent to obtain.3
Hence, to ease exposition herein, we simply note that (i)
subjunctives are assuredly non-truth-functional condition-
als, and (ii) we can take subjunctive conditionals to be a su-
perclass of counterfactual conditionals. A lively overview of
formal systems for modeling subjunctive conditionals can
be found in (Nute 1984). Roughly, prior work can be di-
vided into cotenability theories versus possible-worlds the-
ories. In cotenability theories, a subjunctive φ > ψ holds
iff (C + φ) → ψ holds. Here C is taken to be a set
of laws (logical/physical/legal) cotenable with φ. One ma-
jor issue with many theories of cotenability is that they
at least have the appearance of circularly defining coten-
ability in terms of cotenability. In possible-worlds theories,
semantics of subjunctive conditionals are defined in terms
of possible worlds.4 While conceptually attractive to a de-
gree, such approaches are problematic. For example, many
3E.g., “If you were to practice every day, your serve would be
reliable” is a subjunctive conditional. It might not be the the case
that you’re not already practicing hard. However, “If you had prac-
ticed hard, your serve would have been reliable” is a counterfactual
(because, as it’s said in the literature, the antecedent is “contrary to
fact”).
4E.g., (Lewis 1973) famously aligns each possible world with
an order of relative similarity among worlds, and is thereby able
possible-worlds accounts are vulnerable to proofs that cer-
tain conceptions of possible worlds are provably inconsis-
tent (e.g. see (Bringsjord 1985)). For detailed argumentation
against possible-world semantics for counterfactual condi-
tionals, see (Ellis, Jackson, and Pargetter 1977).
Relevance logics strive to fix issues such as explosion and
non-relevance of antecedents and consequents in material
conditionals; see (Mares 2014) for a wide-ranging overview.
The main concern in relevance logics, as the name im-
plies, is to ensure that there is some amount of relevance
between an antecedent and a consequent of a conditional,
and between the assumptions in a proof and its conclu-
sions. Our model does not reflect this concern, as com-
mon notions of relevance such as variable/expression shar-
ing becomemuddled when the system includes equality, and
become even more muddled when intensionality is added.
Most systems of relevance logic are primarily possible-
worlds-based and share some of the same concerns we have
discussed above. For example, (Mares and Fuhrmann 1995;
Mares 2004) discuss relevance logics that can handle coun-
terfactual conditionals but are all based on possible-worlds
semantics, and the formulae are only extensional in nature.5
Work in (Pereira and Saptawijaya 2016) falls under exten-
sional systems, and as we explain below, is not sufficient for
our modeling requirements.
Differently, recent work in natural language processing
by (Son et al. 2017) focuses on detecting counterfactuals in
social-media updates. Due to the low base rate of counter-
factual statements, they use a combined rule-based and sta-
tistical method for detecting counterfactuals. Their work is
on detecting (and not evaluating, analyzing further, or rea-
soning over) counterfactual conditionals and other counter-
factual statements.
Needed Expressivity
Our modeling goals require a formal system F of ade-
quate expressivity to be used in moral and other theory-
of-mind reasoning tasks. F should be free of any consis-
tency or soundness issues. In particular, F needs to avoid
inconsistencies such as the one demonstrated below, modi-
fied from (Govindarajulu and Bringsjord 2017a). In the in-
ference chain below, we have an agent a who knows that the
murderer is the person who owns the gun. Agent a does not
know that agentm is the murderer, but it’s true thatm is the
owner of the gun. If the knowledge operator K is a simple
first-order logic predicate, we get the proof shown below,
which produces a contradiction from sound premises.
to capture in clever fashion the idea that a counterfactual φ > ψ
holds just in case the possible world satisfying φ that is the most
similar to the actual world also satisfies ψ. While as is plain we are
not fans of possible-worlds semantics, those attracted to such an
approach to counterfactuals would do well in our opinion to survey
(Fritz and Goodman 2017).
5By extensional logics, we refer broadly to non-modal logics
such as propositional logic, first-order logic, second-order logic etc.
By intensional logics, we refer to modal logics. Note that this is
different from intentions which can be represented by intensional
operators, just as knowledge, belief, desires etc can be represented
by intensional operators. See (Zalta 1988) for an overview.
Modeling Knowlege (or any Intension) in First-order Logic
1 K (a, Murderer (owner (gun))) ; given
2 ¬K (a,Murderer (m)) ; given
3 m = owner (gun) ; given
4 K (a,Murderer (m)) ; first-order inference from 3 and 1
5 ⊥ ; first-order inference from 4 and 2
Even more robust representation schemes can
still result in such inconsistencies, or at least un-
soundness, if the scheme is extensional in nature
(Bringsjord and Govindarajulu 2012). Issues such as
this arise due to uniform handling of terms that refer to
the same object in all contexts. This is prevented if the
formal system F is a quantified modal logic (and other
sufficiently expressive intensional systems). We present
one such quantified modal logic below.
Background: Formal System
In this section, we present the formal system in which we
model counterfactual conditionals. The formal system we
use is deontic cognitive event calculus (DCEC). Arkoudas
and Bringsjord (2008) introduced, for their modeling of the
false-belief task, the general family of cognitive event cal-
culi to which DCEC belongs. DCEC has been used to for-
malize and automate highly intensionalmoral reasoning pro-
cesses and principles, such as akrasia (giving in to tempta-
tion that violates moral principles) (Bringsjord et al. 2014).
and the doctrine of double effect described above.6
Briefly, DCEC is a sorted (i.e. typed) quantified modal
logic (also known as sorted first-order modal logic). The
calculus has a well-defined syntax and proof calculus; out-
lined below. The proof calculus is based on natural deduc-
tion (Gentzen 1935), commonly used by practicing mathe-
maticians and logicians, as well as to teach logic; the proof
calculus includes all the standard introduction and elimina-
tion rules for first-order logic, as well as inference schemata
for the modal operators and related structures.
Syntax
DCEC is a sorted calculus. A sorted system can be regarded
analogous to a typed single-inheritance programming lan-
guage. We show below some of the important sorts used in
DCEC. Among these, the Agent, Action, and ActionType
sorts are not native to the event calculus.
The syntax can be thought of as having two components:
a first-order core and a modal system that builds upon this
first-order core. The figures below show the syntax and in-
ference schemata of DCEC. The syntax is quantified modal
logic. The first-order core of DCEC is the event calculus
(Mueller 2006). Commonly used function and relation sym-
bols of the event calculus are included. Other calculi (e.g. the
situation calculus) for modeling commonsense and physical
6 The description of DCEC here is mostly a subset of the dis-
cussion in (Govindarajulu and Bringsjord 2017a) relevant for us.
reasoning can be easly switched out in-place of the event
calculus.
The modal operators present in the calculus include the
standard operators for knowledgeK, beliefB, desireD, in-
tention I, etc. The general format of an intensional operator
is K (a, t, φ), which says that agent a knows at time t the
proposition φ. Here φ can in turn be any arbitrary formula.
Also, note the followingmodal operators:P for perceiving a
state, C for common knowledge, S for agent-to-agent com-
munication and public announcements, B for belief, D for
desire, I for intention, and finally and crucially, a dyadic de-
ontic operator O that states when an action is obligatory or
forbidden for agents. It should be noted that DCEC is one
specimen in a family of easily extensible cognitive calculi.
The calculus also includes a dyadic (arity = 2) deontic
operatorO. It is well known that the unary ought in standard
deontic logic lead to contradictions. Our dyadic version of
the operator blocks the standard list of such contradictions,
and beyond.7
Syntax
S ::= Agent | ActionType | Action ⊑ Event |Moment | Fluent
f ::=


action : Agent × ActionType → Action
initially : Fluent → Formula
Holds : Fluent× Moment → Formula
happens : Event × Moment → Formula
clipped : Moment × Fluent × Moment → Formula
initiates : Event× Fluent × Moment → Formula
terminates : Event × Fluent× Moment → Formula
prior : Moment × Moment → Formula
t ::= x : S | c : S | f(t1, . . . , tn)
φ ::=


q : Formula | ¬φ | φ ∧ ψ | φ ∨ ψ | ∀x : φ(x) |
P(a, t, φ) |K(a, t, φ) |
C(t, φ) | S(a, b, t, φ) | S(a, t, φ) |B(a, t, φ)
D(a, t, φ) | I(a, t, φ)
O(a, t, φ, (¬)happens(action(a∗, α), t′))
Inference Schemata
The figure below shows a fragment of the inference
schemata for DCEC. First-order natural deduction introduc-
tion and elimination rules are not shown. Inference schemata
RK and RB let us model idealized systems that have their
knowledge and beliefs closed under theDCEC proof theory.
While humans are not dedcutively closed, these two rules
lets us model more closely how more deliberate agents such
as organizations, nations and more strategic actors reason.
(Some dialects of cognitive calculi restrict the number of
iterations on intensional operators.) R4 states that knowl-
edge of a proposition implies that the proposition holds R13
ties intentions directly to perceptions (This model does not
take into account agents that could fail to carry out their in-
tentions). R14 dictates how obligations get translated into
known intentions.
7A overview of this list is given lucidly in (McNamara 2010).
Inference Schemata (Fragment)
K(a, t1,Γ), Γ ⊢ φ, t1 ≤ t2
K(a, t2, φ)
[RK]
B(a, t1,Γ), Γ ⊢ φ, t1 ≤ t2
B(a, t2, φ)
[RB]
K(a, t, φ)
φ
[R4]
t < t′, I(a, t, ψ)
P(a, t′, ψ)
[R13]
B(a, t, φ) B(a, t,O(a, t, φ, χ)) O(a, t, φ, χ)
K(a, t, I(a, t, χ))
[R14]
Semantics
The semantics for the first-order fragment is the stan-
dard first-order semantics. The truth-functional connec-
tives ∧,∨,→,¬ and quantifiers ∀, ∃ for pure first-order
formulae all have the standard first-order semantics. The
semantics of the modal operators differs from what is
available in the so-called Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI)
logics (Rao and Georgeff 1991) in many important ways.
For example, DCEC explicitly rejects possible-worlds se-
mantics and model-based reasoning, instead opting for
a proof-theoretic semantics and the associated type of
reasoning commonly referred to as natural deduction
(Gentzen 1935; Francez and Dyckhoff 2010). Briefly, in this
approach, meanings of modal operators are defined via arbi-
trary computations over proofs, as we will see for the coun-
terfactual conditional below.
Reasoner (Theorem Prover)
Reasoning is performed through the first-order
modal logic theorem prover, ShadowProver
(Govindarajulu and Bringsjord 2017a). While we use
the prover in our simulations, describing the prover in more
detail is out of scope for the present paper.8
The Formal Problem
At a time point t, we are given a set of sentencesΓ describing
what the system (or agent at hand) is working with. This set
of sentences can be taken to describe the current state of
the world at t; state of the world before t, up-to to some
horizon h in the past; and also desires and beliefs about the
future. We are given a counterfactual conditional φ →֒ ψ
with possibly (but not always) Γ ⊢ ¬φ. We require that our
formal model provide us with the following:
Required Conditions
1. Given a set of formulae Γ, and a sentence of the form φ →֒
ψ, we should be able to tell whether or not Γ ⊢ φ →֒ ψ.
2. Given a set of formulae Γ, and a sentence of the form
Θ(a, t, φ →֒ ψ), we should be able to tell whether or not
Γ ⊢ Θ(a, t, φ →֒ ψ), hereΘ is either B,K orD.
8The underlying first-order prover is SNARK
(Stickel et al. 1994).
On Using the Material Conditional
If we are considering a simple material conditional φ → ψ,
then if Γ ⊢ ¬φ, then trivially Γ ⊢ φ → ψ, if the proof
calculus subsumes standard propositional logic⊢Prop, as is is
the case with logics used in moral reasoning. Another issue
is that whether Γ ⊢ (φ →֒ ψ) holds is not simply a function
of whether Γ ⊢ φ holds and Γ ⊢ ψ holds, that is →֒ is not a
truth-functional connective, unlike the material conditional
→.
Modeling Counterfactual Conditionals
The general intuition is that given φ →֒ ψ, one has to drop
some of the formulae in Γ arriving at Γ′ and then if (Γ+φ) ⊢
ψ, we can conclude that φ →֒ ψ. More precisely, φ →֒ ψ
can be proven from Γ iff there is a subset Γ′of Γ consistent
with φ such that (Γ′ + φ) ⊢ ψ. Since we are using a natural
deduction proof calculus, we need to specify introduction
and elimination rules for →֒. Let Cons[Φ] denote that a set
of formulae Φ is consistent.
Extensional Context
Rcf1 →֒ Introduction
(
Γ ⊢ φ →֒ ψ
)
⇔¬Cons[{φ}] ∨ ∃Γ′


[I1] Γ
′ ⊆ Γ
[I2] Con[Γ
′ + φ]
[I3] (Γ
′ + φ) ⊢ ψ
The elimination rule for →֒ is much simpler and resembles
the rule for the material conditional→.
Rcf2 →֒ Elimination
Γ + {φ, φ →֒ ψ} ⊢ ψ
Intensional Context
The inference schema given below apply to the presence of
the counterfactual in any arbitrary context Υ. The context
for a formula is defined as below. Let 〈〉 denote the empty
list and let ⊕ denote list concatentation.
→֒ Definition of Υ
Υ[φ] =


〈〉 if the top connective in φ is not modal
〈K, a, t〉,⊕Υ[ψ], if φ ≡ K(a, t, ψ)
〈B, a, t〉,⊕Υ[ψ], if φ ≡ B(a, t, ψ)
〈D, a, t〉,⊕Υ[ψ], if φ ≡ D(a, t, ψ)
For example, Υ[B(a, t1,K(b, t2, P ))] = 〈B, a, t1,K, b, t2〉
With the context defined as above, inference schemata for
→֒ occurring within a modal context is given below.
We also use the following shorthands in the two rules
given below:
(i)Υ[φ] denotes that formula φ has context Υ.
(ii)Υ[Γ] denotes the subset of Γ with context Υ.
Rcf3 →֒ Introduction
(
Γ ⊢ Υ [φ →֒ ψ]
)
⇔ ¬Cons[{φ}] ∨ ∃Γ′


[I1] Γ
′ ⊆ Υ[Γ]
[I2] Con[Γ
′ + φ]
[I3] (Γ
′ + φ) ⊢ ψ
The elimination rule for →֒ under any arbitrary context is
given below.
Rcf4 →֒ Elimination
Γ + {Υ[φ],Υ[φ →֒ ψ]} ⊢ Υ[ψ]
For a simple example of the above rules, see the experiments
sections below.
A Note on Implementing the Introduction Rules
There are two possible dynamic programming algorithms.
In the worst case, both the algorithms amount to searching
over all possible subsets of a given Γ. In the first algorithm,
we start from smaller subsets and compute whether (Γ′ +
φ) ⊢ ψ and Cons[Γ′ + φ]. For any larger sets Γ′′, (Γ′′ +
φ) ⊢ ψ need not be computed. In the second algorithm, we
start with larger subsets and compute (Γ′′ + φ) ⊢ ψ and
Cons[Γ′′ + φ]. For any smaller sets Γ′, Cons[Γ′ + φ] need
not be computed. If ⊢ is first-order and above, the second
algorithm is preferable. If ⊢ encompasses first-order logic,
then computing Cons[Φ] for any set is hard in the general
case. In our implementation, we approximate Cons[Φ] by
running querying a prover forΦ ⊢ ⊥ up to a time limit δ. As
δ increases, the approximation becomes better.
Properties of the System
Now we canvass some meta-theorems about the system. All
the four inference schemata given above, when added to a
monotonic proof theory, preserve monotonicity.
Theorem 1: Monotonicity Preservation
If ⊢ is monotonic, then ⊢ augmented with
Rcf1 , Rcf2 , Rcf3 , and Rcf4 is still monotonic.
Proof Sketch: Notice that the right-hand side of the condi-
tion for the introduction rules stay satisfied if we replace Γ
with a superset Φ. The elimination rules hold regardless of
Γ. 
We assume that ⊢ is monotonic. For monotonic systems,
for any Γ′ ⊆ Γ, Cons[Γ] ⇒ Cons[Γ′]. We show that some
desirable properties that hold for other systems in the litera-
ture hold for the system presented here.
Property 1; ID in (Nute 1984)
{} ⊢ φ →֒ φ
Proof: If ¬Cons[{φ}], we are done. Otherwise, since {φ} ⊢
φ, we can see that I1, I2, and I3 hold.
Property 2; R2 in (Pollock 1976)
(
{} ⊢ φ→ ψ
)
⇒
(
{} ⊢ φ →֒ ψ
)
Proof: Either¬Cons[{φ}] or Cons[{φ}]. If the former holds,
we are done. If the latter holds, then take Γ′ = {} and we
have Cons[Γ′ + φ] and Γ′ + φ ⊢ ψ, satisfying all three con-
ditions I1, I2, and I3. ∴ letting us introduce φ →֒ ψ. 
Property 3; R3 in (Pollock 1976)
(
{} ⊢ φ→ ψ
)
⇒
(
{} ⊢ (χ →֒ φ)→ (χ →֒ ψ)
)
Proof: Assume {} ⊢ φ→ ψ. We need to prove {χ →֒ φ} ⊢
(χ →֒ ψ). If ¬Cons[{χ →֒ φ}], we succeed. Otherwise,
take Γ′ to be {χ →֒ φ}. By the elimination rule we have
{χ →֒ φ} + χ ⊢ φ, and using {} ⊢ φ → ψ, we have
{χ →֒ φ}+χ ⊢ ψ, thus satisfying our conditions I1, I2, and
I3 to introduce χ →֒ ψ. 
Property 4; A6 in (Pollock 1976),MP in (Nute 1984),
If Γ ⊢ φ →֒ ψ, then Γ ⊢ φ→ ψ
Proof:Γ ⊢ (φ →֒ ψ), thereforeΓ+{φ} ⊢ ψ using →֒ -elim .
Using→ -intro we have Γ ⊢ φ→ ψ. 
Property 5;MOD in (Nute 1984)
If Γ ⊢ (¬ψ) →֒ ψ, then Γ ⊢ φ→ ψ
Proof: Given Γ ⊢ (¬ψ) →֒ ψ, therefore using →֒ -elim
Γ + ¬ψ ⊢ ψ, and using ¬-elim we have Γ ⊢ ψ, giving us
Γ ⊢ φ→ ψ. 
Property 6
If Γ ⊢ (φ →֒ ψ) ∧ (ψ →֒ φ)
then Γ ⊢ (φ→ χ) ⇔ Γ ⊢ (ψ → χ)
Proof: We prove the left-to-right direction of the bicondi-
tional
Γ ⊢ (φ→ χ) ⇒ Γ ⊢ (ψ → χ)
Assume Γ ⊢ (φ → χ). We need to prove Γ ⊢ (ψ → χ).
Since we are given Γ ⊢ ψ →֒ φ, either ¬Cons[{ψ}] or there
is a Γ′ ⊆ Γ such that Cons[Γ′ + ψ] and Γ′ + ψ ⊢ φ. If
the former holds, we are finished. If the latter holds, we then
have Γ + ψ ⊢ φ since ⊢ is monotonic. Using the given Γ ⊢
(φ→ χ) and the→ −elimination rule, we obtain Γ+ψ ⊢ χ.
Therefore, Γ ⊢ ψ → χ. 
Property 7; CSO in (Nute 1984)
If {} ⊢ (φ →֒ ψ) ∧ (ψ →֒ φ)
then Γ ⊢ (φ →֒ χ) ⇔ Γ ⊢ (ψ →֒ χ)
Proof: We establish the left-to-right direction of the bicon-
ditional
Γ ⊢ (φ →֒ χ) ⇒ Γ ⊢ (ψ →֒ χ)
Assuming {} ⊢ (φ →֒ ψ) ∧ (ψ →֒ φ) and using Property
4 and ⊢Prop, we have {} ⊢ (φ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → φ); and using
⊢Prop again we obtain {} ⊢ φ ↔ ψ. Assume Γ ⊢ (φ →֒
χ). We need to prove Γ ⊢ (ψ →֒ χ). Since we assumed
Γ ⊢ φ →֒ χ, either ¬Cons[{φ}] or there is a Γ′ ⊆ Γ such
that Cons[Γ′ + φ] and Γ′ + φ ⊢ χ. If the former holds we
are done because ¬Cons[{φ}] ⇒ ¬Cons[{ψ}]. If the latter
holds, we have Cons[Γ′+ψ] and Γ′+ψ ⊢ χ as {} ⊢ φ↔ ψ.

Property 8
If {} ⊢ (φ →֒ ψ) ∧ (ψ →֒ φ)
then Γ ⊢ (χ →֒ φ) ⇔ Γ ⊢ (χ →֒ ψ)
Proof: Similar to the previous proof, we prove the left-to-
qright direction of the biconditional
Γ ⊢ (φ →֒ χ) ⇒ Γ ⊢ (ψ →֒ χ)
Assuming {} ⊢ (φ →֒ ψ) ∧ (ψ →֒ φ) and using Property 4
and ⊢Prop, we deduce {} ⊢ (φ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → φ); and using
⊢Prop again we infer {} ⊢ φ ↔ ψ. Assume Γ ⊢ (χ →֒ φ).
We need to show Γ ⊢ (χ →֒ ψ). Since we assumed Γ ⊢
χ →֒ φ, either ¬Cons[{χ}] or there is a Γ′ ⊆ Γ such that
Cons[Γ′ + χ] and Γ′ + χ ⊢ φ. If the former, we are done; if
the latter, we have Γ′ + χ ⊢ ψ. 
The next property states that if we are given φ →֒ ψ1 and
φ →֒ ψ2, we can reach φ →֒ ψ1 ∧ ψ2. For instance, “If a
had gone to the doctor, a would not have been sick” and “If
a had gone to the doctor, a would be happy now” give us “If
a had gone to the doctor, a would not have been sick and a
would be happy now”.
One property which has been problematic for many pre-
vious formal systems is simplification of disjunctive an-
tecedents (SDA). For instance, given “If a had gone to
the doctor or if a had taken medication, a would not be
sick now” should give us “If a had gone to the doc-
tor, a would not be sick now, and if a had taken medi-
cation, a would not be sick now.” Logics based on pos-
sible worlds find it quite challenging to handle this prop-
erty — yet it seems like a necessary property to secure
(Ellis, Jackson, and Pargetter 1977), though there are some
disagreements on this front (Loewer 1976). As a middle
ground we can prove “If a had gone to the doctor, a would
not be sick now, or if a had taken medication, a would not
be sick now.”
Property 9
If Γ ⊢ (φ1 ∨ φ2) →֒ ψ then
Γ ⊢ (φ1 →֒ ψ) ∨ (φ1 →֒ ψ)
Proof:We need to either proveΓ ⊢ φ1 →֒ ψ or Γ ⊢ φ1 →֒ ψ
and use ∨−introduction to get Γ ⊢ (φ1 →֒ ψ) ∨ (φ2 →֒
ψ). If ¬Cons[φ1 ∨ φ2], we have ¬Cons[φ1] and ¬Cons[φ2],
we then reach our conclusion. Otherwise, if Cons[φ1 ∨ φ2],
then there is a Γφ1∨φ2 serving as Γ
′. We need to prove three
clauses:
(1) I1 is satisfied as Γ
′ = Γφ1∨φ2 .
(2) I2 is satisfied because if Cons[Γ
′ + φ1 ∨ φ2] then at
least one of Cons[Γ′ + φ1] or Cons[Γ
′ + φ2]; other-
wise if Γ′ + φ1 ⊢ ⊥ and Γ
′ + φ2 ⊢ ⊥, giving us
Γ′ + (φ1 ∨ φ2) ⊢ ⊥ through ∨-elim , which overthrows
our assumption that Cons[Γ′ + (φ1 ∨ φ2)]. So either
Cons[Γ′ + φ1] or Cons[Γ
′ + φ2], then I2 is satisfied for
either φ1 →֒ ψ or φ2 →֒ ψ. Assume that it holds for the
former.
(3) I3 is satisfied as {φ1} ⊢ φ1∨φ2 and we have Γ
′+(φ1∨
φ2) ⊢ ψ; therefore Γ
′ + φ1 ⊢ ψ. 
With stronger assumptions we can obtain a property that
directly resembles SDA.
Property 10
If
(
Γ ⊢ (φ1 ∨ φ2) →֒ ψ
and Γ 6⊢ ¬φ1 and Γ 6⊢ ¬φ2
)
then Γ ⊢ (φ1 →֒ ψ) ∧ (φ1 →֒ ψ)
Proof: The proof is similar to the previous proof, needing
only minor modifications.
Property 11, A4 in (Pollock 1976)
If Γ ⊢ (φ →֒ ψ) and Γ ⊢ (φ →֒ χ)
then Γ ⊢ (φ ∧ ψ) →֒ χ
Proof: Since we have Γ ⊢ (φ →֒ χ), either ¬Cons[{φ}] or
there is a Γ′ ⊆ Γ such that Cons[Γ′ + φ] ⊢ χ. If the former
holds, we have¬Cons[{φ∧ψ}], giving us Γ ⊢ (φ∧ψ) →֒ χ.
If the latter holds, we have Γ′ + (φ ∧ ψ) ⊢ χ. Assume that
¬Cons[Γ′ + (φ ∧ ψ)]; then we get Γ ∪ {φ, ψ} ⊢ ⊥, giv-
ing us Γ + φ ⊢ ¬ψ through ¬−introduction. With → −
introduction we get Γ ⊢ φ → ¬ψ, but using Property 4
and the given Γ ⊢ φ →֒ ψ, we have Γ ⊢ φ → ψ. There-
fore, Γ ⊢ ¬φ. This goes against Cons[Γ′+ φ], giving us that
Cons[Γ′+(φ∧ψ)]. This satisfies I1, I2, and I3 which yields
Γ ⊢ (φ ∧ ψ) →֒ χ. 
Finally, we have the following theorem, the proof of
which can be obtained by exploiting all the properties above.
Theorem 2
All the above properties hold if every counterfactual φ →֒ ψ
is replaced by Υ[φ →֒ ψ].
Given the above, we can prove the following, using rules
R4 and R14. The following theorem gives an account of
how an agent might assert a counterfactual conditional in
a moral/ethical situation.
Theorem 3(
Γ ⊢ B
(
a, t,O(a, t, φ, χ)
)
∧O(a, t, φ, χ)
)
⇒
(
Γ ⊢ B(a, t, φ) →֒ χ
)
Experiments
We describe two experiments that demonstrate the model in
action, the first in moral dilemmas and the second in general
situations.9
9Axioms for both the experiments, data and the reasoning sys-
tem can be obtained here: https://goo.gl/nDZtWX
Counterfactual Conditionals in Moral Dilemmas
We look at moral dilemmas used in
(Govindarajulu and Bringsjord 2017a). Each dilemma
d has an axiomatization Γd. Two such dilemmas are axiom-
atized and studied in (Govindarajulu and Bringsjord 2017a).
Assume that an agent a is facing a given dilemma d. The
axiomatization Γd includes a’s knowledge and beliefs about
the dilemma. We show that for each d, we can get C5a and
C5b. Note that C5a and C5b talk about situations. Though
event calculus does not directly model situations, we can
use fluents to do so. A situation is formalized as an object
of sort Situation:
Situation ⊏ Object
We have the following additional symbols that tell us when
an agent is in a situation and what actions are possible for an
agent in a situation at a given time:
in : Agent× Situation → Fluent
Action : Agent× ActionType× Situation×Moment
→ Formula
We have the following axiom which states that the only ac-
tions that an agent can perform in a situation at a time are
those sanctioned by the Action predicate.
∀a : Agent, α : ActionType, t : Moment.
 happens(action(a, α), t)→
∃σ : Situation.
(
Holds(in(a, σ), t) ∧ Action(a, α, σ, t)
)


As a warmup to C5b, we state C5a below. Let the current
agent be I and time be denoted by t. The formula below
states that the agent believes it is in a situation σ′ and de-
sires to be in a situation σ′ different from σ with at least one
action type α that is not forbidden and does not have any
negative effects.10 Here µ : Fluent → R denotes the total
utility of a fluent for all agents and all times.
Formalization ofC5a
B (I, t,Holds (in (I, σ)))∧
D


I, t, ∃ρ


Holds (in (I, σ))∧
∃α


Action(I, α, ρ, t)∧
¬O(I, t, ρ,¬happens(action(I, α), t)
¬∃f
(
[µ(f) < 0] ∧ initiates(α, f, t)
)
¬∃f
(
[µ(f) > 0] ∧ terminates(α, f, t)
)






Let αD be the DDE-complaint action that the agent is
saddled with in the current situation σ. LetΘ(σ, t) be the in-
ner statement in the desires modal operator above. The state-
ment below formalizesC5b and can be read as the agent be-
lieving that if the agent were in a different situation with at
least one action that is not forbidden and does not have any
negative effects, it would then not perform the action αD
required of it by DDE .
10Note that this is a mere first formulation of a complex mental
state and further refinements, simple and drastic, are possible and
expected.
Formalization ofC5b
B
(
I, t, Θ(σ, t) →֒ ¬happens
(
action(I, αD), t+ 1
))
We derive the above two conditions from: (1) axioms de-
scribing situations; and (2) common knowledge C(Φ) dic-
tating that agents should only perform non-forbidden ac-
tions and in a non-dilemma situation will peform an action
with only positive effects.C5a takes around 780ms andC5b
takes around 8.378s .
Evaluation of the System
We demonstrate the feasibility of our system by showing the
model working for a small dataset of representative prob-
lems. There are 16 problems each with its own set of as-
sumptions Γ. For each problem Γ, we have a statement that
is provably counterfactual, that is Γ ⊢ ¬φ. Using this state-
ment, we build three conditionals: (1) a counterfactual con-
ditional φ →֒ ψ; (2) an absurd material conditional φ→ ⊥;
and (3) an absurd counterfactual φ →֒ ⊥. The number of
premises range from 2 to 15. One simple problem is shown
below:
Γ =
{
∀x :
(
Human(x)→ Mortal(x)
)
,Human(socrates)
}
Γ ⊢ ¬Mortal(socrates) →֒ ¬Human(socrates)
Γ ⊢ ¬Mortal(socrates) → (P ∧ ¬P )
Γ 6⊢ ¬Mortal(socrates) →֒ (P ∧ ¬P )
The table below shows how much time proving the true and
false counterfactuals takes when compared with proving the
absurd material conditional for the same problem. As ex-
pected, the counterfactual conditional takes more time than
the material conditional. The absurd counterfactual φ →֒ ⊥
is merely intended as a sanity check and the large reason-
ing times are expected (mainly due to timeouts), and is not
expected to be a common use case.
Formula Mean (s) Min (s) Max (s)
φ →֒ ψ 2.496 0.449 11.14
φ→ ⊥ 0.169 0.089 0.341
φ →֒ ⊥ 19.7 1.93 120.67
Conclusion & Future Work
We have presented a novel formal model for counterfac-
tual conditionals. We have applied this model to complete
a formalization of an important ethical principle, the doc-
trine of double effect. We have also provided an implemen-
tation of a reasoning system and a dataset with counter-
factual conditionals. There are three main threads for fu-
ture work. First, the reasoning algorithm is quite simple
and can be improved by looking at either hand-built or
learned heuristics. Second, we hope to leverage recent work
in developing an uncertainty system for a cognitive calculus
(Govindarajulu and Bringsjord 2017b). Finally, we hope to
build a more robust and extensive dataset of counterfactual
reasoning validated by multiple judgements from humans.
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